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INTERNATIONAL STRAITS: THE RIGHT
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By R. Palmer Cundick**
I. CONTEMPORARY CLAIMS AND INTERNATIONAL STRAITS: SCOPE OF
THE PROBLEM
The quest for utilization of ocean space and resources has assumed
such immense proportions that the resolution of conflicting claims of
nation states to use and develop that space and those resources may well
be one of the most important challenges of our time. States now tend
to look seaward and to expand their wealth and power bases as far as
they can. Claims have been asserted to nearly every variety of legal
competence, from limited special interests to vast territorial sea claims.
Clearly, through this process certain rights of the international com-
munity are being abused. Unless restraint and order are exercised, and
unless rules more representative of community interests are developed,
the potential for maximizing ocean use will be lost.
A. Background-Factors Creating Conflict
Among the numerous claims being made by states, two such claims
are the subjects of particular conflict. The first is the claim to extend
the territorial sea, and thereby subject international straits to a terri-
torial sea regime. The second is the claim to use such straits indepen-
dently of a territorial sea regime. Since straits are essential corridors to
or between the high seas for all maritime nations, the question of how
their use shall be regulated is a strategically vital one. Recognition of
even a 12-mile territorial sea brings traditional territorial sea rights into
conflict with traditional free passage rights in more than 100 straits.,
Recognition of more ambitious claims, some reaching up to 200 miles,
would affect every ocean highway, as virtually every passage between
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two free seas would then lie within the territorial sea of some nation.'
The dimensions of this conflict have confronted all nations suddenly.
The past two decades have witnessed unprecedented changes in technol-
ogy. 3 Supertankers and nuclear powered submarines and naval vessels
have become important users of the oceans. Offshore oil and gas pro-
duction has become an increasingly important source of energy. Sophis-
ticated fishing methods have threatened depletion, even exhaustion of
fisheries. Commercial extraction of hard minerals from the ocean floor
may soon become a reality. Marine pollution has emerged as a signifi-
cant problem. Opportunities for use and abuse of the sea and its re-
sources have become of global concern.
These developments have formed the impetus behind the recent shift
from permissive use of the oceans by the world community to demands
for greater exclusive use by individual coastal states.
Controversy over straits is a recent problem. Under rules achieving
widespread acceptance during the last century, nations made territorial
sea claims of only three or four miles. In most of the world's major
straits, these claims generally left a high seas corridor in which the
unrestricted right of passage for all ships was operative, subject only to
a reasonable regard for the interests of other nations in the exercise of
their high seas freedoms.
In the few territorial seas which overlapped important straits, ar-
rangements were eventually devised to permit transit. The Danish and
Turkish straits are examples of such arrangements.'
It was not until governments seriously began contemplating a recog-
nition of the expansion of the territorial sea that attention focused on
the necessity of continued transit through straits used for international
navigation as the key element to agreement on a new territorial sea
regime.' The Government of Spain noted, "The general legal regime of
navigation through international straits never raised any problem to the
International Community until 1967, when the Governments of the
United States and the Soviet Union started negotiations on the Law of
I See 0. Khlestov, International-Legal Problems of the World Ocean, INT'L AFFAIRS, (Moscow)
Mar. 1973, at 42.
3 See Stevenson, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 672, 673 (1972).
The Sound Dues were abolished by the Treaty of 1857, to which the powers on the Baltic and
North Sea were parties. For history, see H. WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 518
(1845). For the Turkish Straits, see Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, July 20, 1936,
173 L.N.T.S. 213; F. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 386 (1941).
1 An early identification of straits as critical from a military point of view was Carlisle, Three
Mile Limit-Obsolete Concept?, in U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Feb. 1967, at 24. For
a discussion of adverse consequences of a 12-mile limit, see Lawrence, Military Legal Considera-
tions in the Extention of the Territorial Sea, 29 MIL. L. REV. 47 (1965).
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the Sea." 6 Of course, wider territorial sea claims affect more straits and
more nations. What is surprising is not that so many nations are af-
fected, but that so many nations have been so slow to appreciate that
fact.
The Third Law of the Sea Conference is attempting to address most
of the major problems emerging from ocean use. Several states have
submitted draft proposals which address the straits problem. These pro-
posals fall into two general categories: (1) those advocating an innocent
passage regime, and (2) those advocating a free passage regime.7 Varia-
tion of these proposals call for a restriction or liberalization of innocent
passage, qualifications on free passage, and exceptions in favor of cer-
tain straits. There has been little accommodation. Underlying the inflex-
ibility in these proposals is their focus on a context requiring agreement
on a maximum territorial sea width as a condition to resolving the
straits issue, rather than treating straits as a functional problem which
could be resolved independently of such width.
B. The Conflict
Coastal states advancing claims to extend the territorial sea provide
a panoply of legal bases as applicable to straits. The more moderate
positions assert what amounts to an exclusive competence to control
navigation within the territorial sea, including straits, although they
generally recognize that their powers are essentially delegated by the
international community." Most extreme are the positions of certain
coastal states which see national sovereignty as the touchstone to justify
all claims.
The straits problem is essentially one of resolving duties and rights
of states inter se. It is unfortunate to frame it in the context of sover-
I Spanish Aide Memoire transmitted to the Secretary of State, U.S.A., from Gregorio Lopez-
Bravo, Mar. 16, 1972, at 1.
I The Soviets claim a customary international law right to continue transiting international
straits independent of the breadth of the territorial sea--clearly a de facto recognition of the sui
juris legal status at least of important international straits. The Soviet draft provides for freedom
of transit in the principal straits used for international navigation, as opposed to all straits, and
excludes straits connecting the high seas to the territorial sea of a foreign state. For USSR
proposal, see 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 162, U.N. Doc. A/AC./38/SC II/L.7 (1972). It is
significant that the Soviets have never opposed a 12-mile territorial sea by other states (which
would be somewhat awkward in view of the 12-mile Soviet claim). Yet, they have consistently
maintained that such claims would not disrupt rights presently enjoyed by the Soviets and other
nations in international straits. For a discussion of current proposals, see Stevenson and Oxman,
The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974).
"The historical evolution of the Law of the Sea ... is characterised by a delegation of powers
by the International Community in favour of coastal States, as nations directly interested and in
need of protection." Supra note 6, at 10.
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eignty-not the sovereignty historically limited by the sovereignty of
other states to use common resources, but an absolute sovereignty which
would permit arbitrary exclusion of other states from common re-
sources. This emotionalizes issues which should be resolved on their
merits and vitiates attempted accommodation. Claims have proliferated
in recent years partially because of the popularity of this appraisal of
sovereignty. They germinate conflict by their irretractable all-or-
nothing approach.
The principal shortcoming of the contemporary extended territorial
sea philosophy is that it assumes that all other rights are subservient to
territorial sea rights. Concomitantly, this view fails to recognize that,
applied to an expanded context, territorial sea rights may conflict with
rights already vested in the international community which have an
independent and at least parallel juridical hierarchy. By fiat, these
coastal states have declared that all law of the sea which constrains their
claims is outmoded and no longer binding in the modern law of nations.
The paradox, however, is that they have endorsed those concepts of
coastal state sovereignty which were developed by the law of nations for
a narrow territorial sea, and proclaimed them as still binding and applic-
able in however broad a context the coastal state, in its sovereign pre-
rogative, should deem appropriate.
In opposition are claims of maritime nations which have approached
the problem in a manner equally inimical to international community
interests. Although admitting that the tremendous interaction of ocean
activities affecting coastal states may require certain protective mea-
sures at extensive distances from shore, these nations have conceptually
applied a traditional narrow territorial sea regime to resolve problems
which do not respect boundaries, rather than recognizing that that re-
gime, too, without some adaptation, is equally outmoded and inade-
quate in the modern law of nations.
These respective claims reflect two differing concepts of transit: inno-
cent passage and free passage. Innocent passage, applicable within the
territorial sea of a state, only permits transit by vessels which do not
threaten the peace, good order, and security of the coastal state. Inno-
cent passage is not extended to overflight of aircraft or submerged
submarine traffic, which may transit the territorial sea only upon receiv-
ing coastal state consent. Free passage permits navigation by all vessels
and aircraft, without distinction.
In attempting to extend the application of innocent passage rights
which are precisely intended to regulate the interaction of interests in
narrow territorial seas, states are discovering, in a broad territorial sea
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context, genuine conflicting interests with international community
rights which were previously unaffected. Whatever the advantages to
coastal states of extending the territorial sea, it is the extension of the
innocent passage regime to the detriment of vessels now enjoying exten-
sive high seas rights of the free passage, which is so potentially disrup-
tive to international navigation. Assuming the eventual recognition of
at least a 12-mile territorial sea, the question is whether coastal states
shall be permitted to "close off" straits used for international navigation
by applying an innocent passage doctrine to supersede the more exten-
sive existing navigation rights presently exercised by the community of
nations in the form of high seas freedoms.' Herein lies the most acute
problem if new territorial sea claims are unqualifiedly recognized and
applied in international straits.
II. THE NEED FOR A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
The solitary concept of a 12-mile territorial sea is not objectionable
in the abstract. The concept that does give rise to objection is that of a
12-mile territorial sea at the expense of existing navigation rights. The
problem could be avoided if navigation rights were not determined by
an arbitrary territorial sea breadth, but were perceived in their func-
tional character. This means essentially the recognition of a regime in
which the navigation function (as expressed in freedom of access) is
accorded a higher priority than arbitrary territorial sea boundaries. The
measurable width of the territorial sea then assumes less importance.
States could pursue other legitimate objectives within their territorial
sea, leaving navigation rights presently enjoyed by the international
community in the conduct of international trade, communication and
state business to continue without unnecessary conflict. Unfortunately,
proposals have followed a rigid traditional territorial sea and high seas
dichotomy which has tended to polarize claims.
As the fundamental community interests in straits navigation do not
change, it seems desirable to avoid linking the transit right so com-
pletely to the breadth of the territorial sea. Rather, it should be recog-
nized as conceptually separate from territorial sea, resource or other
claims of coastal states. So separated, navigation's functional character
would remain unimpeded and international navigation would remain
operationally secure regardless of the new width of the territorial sea
or resource zones agreed upon. Moreover, each new territorial sea claim
' The term "closed" is commonly used to refer to straits which, due to overlapping territorial
sea claims, are subject to a legal regime different from that of the high seas.
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would no longer affect navigation rights through international straits,
so the validity of such claim for non-navigation purposes could then be
evaluated on their own merits.
It is appropriate to ask whether all straits should be subject to the
same juridical treatment. Some straits are indispensable if ocean navi-
gation is to be at all feasible. Others are highly useful, and some are
merely of considerable convenience. Conceivably, straits could be
ranked in order of importance, or grouped as those of a greater or lesser
order. Such factors as volume of traffic, special geographical hazards,
economic costs of alternate routing, and strategic value, all provide
means of distinguishing one strait from another. Yet, while there are
adequate bases to distinguish straits for particular purposes, it must be
remembered that their function is identical.
The most viable approach to community interests is to avoid a classi-
fication of straits which will ultimately prejudice their functional value.
This is best accomplished by treating all international straits as func-
tional equivalents, irrespective of their utility at any particular period
of time, for purposes of rejecting coastal authority to deny freedom of
access. (Of course, straits otherwise governed by international agree-
ments, or historically under the control of the coastal state would not
be included.) This functional, rather than territorial, approach to straits
is essential.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND ACCESS RESPECTING THE SEA
The relation of sovereign states to the sea is under continual reexami-
nation as sovereign rights to use ocean resources collide with sovereign
rights to exclude other users. Regarding navigation, if the idea of the
equality of states is valid in international law, that idea implicitly means
the equality of sovereigns. If sovereignty is to be the touchstone for
coastal state control over littoral waters, sovereignty ought also to be
the touchstone for constraints on that control. The sovereignty of the
coastal state is thus constrained by the sovereignty of other states. Ex-
cesses by one state constitute impermissible invasions of the domain of
the other.
The chief dangers facing current navigation interests are an upset of
the delicate balance of sovereign interests and a fear that proposed
solutions to ocean problems will be at the expense of one group of states
or another. To comprehend the vitality of mutual restraint of sovereigns
it is helpful to review the modern development of the sovereignty con-
cept in the territorial sea.
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The mutual and reciprocal constraint of sovereignty was noted in the
19th century by Wheaton, who observed:
The territorial sovereignty may be limited by the right of other nations
to navigate the seas thus connected. The physical power which the
State, bordering on both sides the sound or strait, has of appropriating
its waters, and of excluding other nations from their use, is here en-
countered by the moral obstacle arising from the right of other nations
to communicate with each other.'0
At the 1930 Hague Codification Conference the question of a termi-
nology that most competently described the rights and powers of the
coastal state in the territorial sea was extremely controversial. States
desired to express rights and duties essential to coastal state control, yet
they feared that failure to define them articulately would result in a
disruption of rights which nations collectively enjoyed on the high seas.
Terms such as "competence", "jurisdiction" and "sovereignty" were
debated at length. "Sovereignty" was the natural choice, but it pro-.
moted considerable apprehension."
States advocating the use of "sovereignty" acknowledged that al-
though there must be some restriction upon the term, it was most de-
scriptive in that "wherever the rights of other States do not exist, and
where there are no servitudes, the coastal State has exclusive jurisdic-
tion."'" Others opined that fear of the idea of sovereignty stemmed from
abuses in the past, that "the recent development of solidarity and inter-
national co-operation have done much to render the notion of sover-
eignty very relative,"' 13 that "sovereignty is no longer regarded as abso-
lute" and most accurately "represents the sum-total of the powers exer-
cised in accordance with international law."'"
Notwithstanding the difficulties in defining sovereignty, states de-
cided to adopt that term with the condition that it would always be
understood to be restricted:' 5 Mr. Erich, the Finnish delegate, noted:
10 H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (Phillipson ed. 1916) [hereinafter cited
as H. WHEATON].
" Sir Maurice Gwyer of Great Britain commented: "It was surprising that, in an Assembly of
the representatives of more than forty sovereign States, the very idea of the use of the word
"sovereignty" should have occasioned such terror-I almost said panic; but I have listened care-
fully to the observations of the Norwegian delegate and I appreciate that there may be certain
difficulties in the use of that expression." 3 ACTS OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, TERRITORIAL WATERS 37, Minutes of the Second Committee, (C. 35 l(b).
M. 145(b). 1930 V.) [hereinafter cited as 1930 ACTS]. The final Act, Committee Reports, and
Annexes of the Conference can be found at 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 169 (Supp. 1930).
IS Views of the Chairman of the Second Committee, 1930 ACTS, supra note 11, at 37.
'3 Views of the Egyptian delegate, Abd el Hamid Badaui Pasha, id. at 39.
1' Views of the French delegate, Mr. Gidel, id. at 43.
"S Strictly speaking, the State has no "sovereignty" over the waters of the sea around
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"We need have no scruple in dispensing with any explanatory epithet,
even if it were explicitly limitative, since it is self-evident that sover-
eignty is always understood to be restricted.""6
Thus the Committee's vote recognized that states possess not sover-
eignty, but the attributes of sovereignty over their territorial waters. 7
As the Swedish delegate stated,
We voted for retaining the word 'sovereignty', a term which we have
nearly all stated and recognized to be somewhat obscure, and which,
on that account, might give rise to misunderstanding . . . merely be-
cause we could not find any other term representing the body of rights
and duties which a coastal State possesses, and is bound to possess,
over its territorial waters."
The precise limitations on sovereignty were not clear. "This sover-
eignty is, of course, limited by the rights of common user,"'" limited by
"international rules recognized by the nations, either by convention or
by custom,"' 0 and, as it is not a "rigid and absolute quality," it is
"capable of adaptation, consistent with certain restrictions in favour of
other states."''2
Some states viewed sovereign powers over the territorial sea as only
exercisable pursuant to delegation by the international community. Mr.
Sitensky of Czechoslovakia stated that:
It would perhaps have been more correct to take as our starting point,
not the principle of the sovereignty of the coastal States, but the oppos-
ite principle, that of the freedom of the seas, the freedom of maritime
navigation. This freedom of navigation might then be limited by grant-
ing to the coastal State. . . within . . . the territorial waters belt, such
rights and powers as it requires to safeguard its security. Such . . .
body of rights . . . can be called rights of sovereignty.22
The genesis, then, of coastal state sovereignty in the territorial sea as
its coasts; it has only a body or group of rights over those waters, a kind of "compe-
tence" or "jurisdiction" (I would emphasize those two words) .... Nevertheless, the
notion of "sovereignty" appears to have become very elastic and liable to changes and
even to certain restrictions. I am, therefore, prepared, if need be, to accept the word
"sovereignty" in a special technical sence.
Views of Mr. Arango of Columbia, id. at 36.
" Id. at 44.
I Id. at 59.
" Views of the Swedish delegate, Mr. Sjoborg, id. at 68.
" Views of the German delegate, Mr. Schucking, id. at 12.
' Views of the Yugoslavian delegate, Mr. Novakovitch, id. at 44.
21 Views of the Finnish delegate, Mr. Erich, id.
" Id. at 24.
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of 1930 was one of restriction and adaptation in favor of existing rights
of other states. As. one delegate concisely described it, "In respect of
territorial waters, the sovereignty of the coastal State is checked by the
sovereignty of the flag State.
12 3
An examination of the 1930 Conference makes it apparent that states
viewed their existing rights of passage as rather comprehensive. Illustra-
tive of that perspective is the remark of the Spanish delegate:
The question is whether the right of sovereignty is compatible with the
right of passage without any qualification. For my own part, I reply
in the affirmative. Modern law has formulated the principle that there
is no absolute right of sovereignty. That being so, there is no contradic-
tion between the right of sovereignty and the right of passage.24
From the history of these proceedings and subsequent ones in 1958,
it is clear that, for purposes of the territorial sea, sovereignty of the
coastal state is constrained by sovereignty of the flag state, and the
former is not a derogation of the later.
IV. ASSESS TO PORTS
Just as the high seas freedom of navigation is meaningless if states
do not have access to the sea, it is also meaningless if vessels cannot
cross the territorial sea of a state to enter the port of a third state which
desires to trade with them. Similarly, it is meaningless if the third state
is "port-locked" and unable to send its vessels at will across such terri-
torial sea to enter the high seas and trade with other states, or send its
state vessels to conduct state business. The recognition that the right of
access to ports is an independent right is expressed by Jessup as follows:
[Innocent passage is a] traditional right developed as a necessary part
of the law of territorial waters because even the three mile limit some-
times cut (sic) across established trade routes. . . .So long as the
passage was innocent, ships were permitted to pass through territorial
waters along such routes. . . . [Tihe right of innocent passage histori-
cally had nothing to do with the passage of the ships bound to or from
a port of the States and a right of access to ports should be distin-
guished from the right of innocent passage.2 5
At the 1958 Conference, the International Law Commission's (ILC's)
draft omitted any reference to the right of access to ports or to terri-
2 Views of the Norwegian delegate, Mr. Raestad, id. at 33.
24 Id. at 65.
Jessup, The United National Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 234, 247
(1959).
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torial waters through international straits. States perceiving this omis-
sion viewed access to both ports and territorial seas as functionally the
same problem. The Netherland representative noted that it was "insuffi-
cient to declare the high seas open to traffic without also guaranteeing
the right of entry into seaports. If the right of access to ports was to be
assured to landlocked States, afortiori, it should be guaranteed to the
maritime countries. ' 2 The British delegate observed that "passage was
not impeded in waters which were essential to maritime communica-
tions. The main purpose of any maritime voyage was, after all, to arrive
at the port of destination." z
States exercising the right of access have not generally based their
claim as derivative from the status of waters through which passage was
required, but on the broader right of access to ports. Israel, for example,
said that international waterways are open to navigation in spite of the
fact that they lie within the territorial sea of another state. "Regardless
of their position as territorial sea, straits in the geographical sense which
constitute the only access to a harbour belonging to another State can
under no circumstances fall within the regime of territorial sea." 2s
If the foregoing view is accurate, the international interest in uphold-
ing the right of access is given predominance over those of the littoral
states whose territorial seas have to be traversed in making for a given
harbor, and passage through straits is assimilated to high seas naviga-
tion rights themselves .2
V. ACCESS FROM HIGH SEAS TO HIGH SEAS
The right of all nations to use the high seas stands as the fundamental
principle underlying the legal structure of the law of the seas. Histori-
cally, that principle meant that (1) all nations have an equal right to use
the high seas, (2) one nation may not unreasonably interfere with the
lawful use of the high seas by another, and (3) each nation retains
jurisdiction over activities conducted on the high seas under its flag or
nationality.
In the context of navigation, if access from one high seas to another
is denied any state, it no longer has the means to enjoy the right to use
the high seas. Since straits are the key geographical points which make
n 3 U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAWS OF THE SEA 88, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.52 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as U.N. CONF.].
11 Id. at 79.
u Comments submitted to the ILC by Israel concerning the Draft Regime of the Territorial Sea,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 988, 1012 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Israeli Comments].
2' See id. at 1005 (1956).
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transit between high seas areas possible, their defacto navigation is the
only guarantee that states can enjoy high seas rights.
A. Historical Perspective
The straits problem was not generally significant until the last decade
or two when nations began seriously to consider an extended territorial
sea. With the exception of straits such as those of Turkey and Denmark
where passage conflicts had to be resolved, little attention was given to
the straits problem. Among those writers who did address it however,
there was considerable agreement. Several influential 19th century writ-
ers had perceived the functional importance of straits and their value
to the international community. The French jurist, Hautefeuille, noted
that even a strait which separates two shores controlled by the same
state remains nevertheless in the condition of the ocean itself, free of
all shackles, and that "to wish to close such a passage to other nations
would be to deprive them, in reality, of the right that they have to use
the sea for navigation." He carefully distinguished the question of the
status of international straits through which a right of passage is recog-
nized from such rights as fishing and jurisdiction, which he concedes
remain in the coastal state without prejudice to the use of a strait as a
thoroughfare.3
Another Frenchman, Godey, perhaps the first authority of record to
propose that straits be subject to a special regime, fixed the extent of
the territorial waters in straits at three nautical miles and demanded that
the high seas portion of an international strait be subject to special rules
different from the ordinary rules regarding the open sea.3
More modern writers supported this functional view. According to
Hyde, "The relation which the channel of communication bears to navi-
gation generally as a means of access to the seas thus connected...
rather than any other circumstance, is decisive of the equities of foreign
maritime states. 32
Just after the turn of the century the German jurist, Walter Shuck-
ing, maintained that where straits connect two open seas and are of
importance to international shipping, they must never be completely
closed, even if passage is not possible without touching the territorial
waters of one or more states.3
, I E. BRUEL, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS 56 (1947) [hereinafter cited as E. BRUEL].
s' Id. at 59.
n "A strait which serves as a passage from one open sea to another ought not on principle
to be closed. This is believed to be true although the waterway is a part of the domain of the
States adjacent to it." I C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 519 (2d ed. 1954).
3 I E. BRUEL, supra note 30, at 64.
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After 1950, Colombos wrote that "the regime of the territorial straits
is similar to that of all national waters, but subject to freedom of naviga-
tion for the vessels of all nations where such straits form part of the
highway of international traffic. ' 4
These authorities contended pragmatically that freedom of navigation
has little meaning unless it permits vessels to travel from port to port,
and sea to sea. Their view was that high seas rights of navigation must
be exercised as rights, and not on sufferance.35
B. Judicial Perspective
The Corfu Channel case is the landmark international judicial deci-
sion upholding passage through straits.36 The decision has been sub-
jected to various interpretations and cited to substantiate numerous,
often conflicting, views. It is best understood when viewed in its histori-
cal and factual context.
Immediately following World War II certain littoral states attempted
to exclude foreign warships from waters traditionally considered inter-
national. In October of 1946, two of four British warships were heavily
damaged by mines while passing through the North Corfu Strait37
within Albanian territorial waters.38 The United Kingdom asserted that
its warships had a right to transit the strait, that Albania had illegally
mined or consented to the mining of an international strait, and that
Albania was in violation of international law for failure to warn the
warships of the danger to their navigation in the area.
Albania denied that it had knowledge of the mines,3' but insisted that
British warships were not entitled to transit the straits without her con-
sent, and that the United Kingdom vessels had violated her territorial
sovereignty. 0 Albania first contended that the North Corfu Strait was
' C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 180 (5th ed. 1962).
0 The work which most perceptibly addresses straits on a functional basis is R. BAXTER, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS (1964) [hereinafter cited as R. BAXTER]. For a good collec-
tion of views of other writers supporting this functional approach, see I BRUEL, supra note 30, at
48-69.
U Corfu Channel Case, [19491 I.C.J. 4, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 558 (1949).
2 The North Corfu Channel separates Albania from the Greek island of Corfu and is little
more than a mile wide at its narrowest point and less than six miles wide elsewhere.
u The British force was observed and reported to Albanian coastal defense authorities who
made no attempt to warn the vessels. Almost two hours later, the Saumarez struck an underwater
mine and was heavily damaged. Volac took the striken vessel in tow, but also struck a mine. British
casualties were one officer and 37 ratings killed and two officers and 43 ratings wounded. The
Times (London), Oct. 24, 1946, at 6, col. 7.
" Albania contended that she had neither access to the type of mines used, nor sufficient naval
vessels with which to lay them. The British contended that the field had been laid by Yugoslavia,
Albania's ally, either at the request of, or with the consent of, Albania.
1' If the minefield was laid without the consent of Albania, that constituted a serious violation
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not an international highway, that the Corfu Channel, although heavily
transited by both merchant and war vessels, was not an international
strait,4 and that had it been closed entirely to international shipping,
an alternate route around the island was reasonably available which
would have added scarcely 100 miles to the shipping route. The Court
found, however, that the North Corfu Channel belonged "to the class
of international highways through which passage cannot be prohibited
by a coastal State in time of peace.""
In categorizing the strait as an international highway, the Court said,
It may be asked whether the test is to be found in the volume of traffic
passing through the Strait or in its greater or lesser importance for
international navigation. But in the opinion of the Court the decisive
criterion is rather its geographic situation as connecting two parts of
the high seas and the fact of its being used for international navigation.
Nor can it be decisive that this Strait is not a necessary route between
two parts of the high seas, but only an alternative passage between the
Aegean and the Adriatic Seas."
Thus, the geographical criterion, coupled with the use criterion is con-
trolling, and it is not a requirement that an international strait be "nec-
essary" if it is "a useful route for international maritime traffic. '",
The Albanian Government next maintained a right to exclude war-
ships for protection of its own security interests and alleged that passage
of the warships was not of an innocent character. Albania and Greece
were in a state of de facto hostility at the time;45 Britain was an ally of
of her sovereignty. There was no evidence of any complaint by Albania on this count, or any official
investigation to determine who had laid the mines.
11 Statistics indicating the degree to which the Corfu Channel was actually used by international
shipping where furnished the Court for the period April 1, 1936 through December 31, 1937.
During that period 2,884 vessels put in at the Port of Corfu and transited the Channel. The flags
of the ships were Greek, Romanian, Yugoslav, French, Albanian and British. The total did not
include vessels in transit which did not call at Corfu. The British Navy regularly used the Channel
for more than 80 years, as did the navies of other states. [1949] I.C.J. 4, 29.
42 Id.
,1 Id. at 28.
44 Id.
" The Court was fully cognizant of the state security basis of the Albanian claims: "it is a fact
• . . that Greece had declared that she considered herself. . . in a state of war with Albania, and
that Albania, invoking the danger of Greek incursion, had considered it necessary to take certain
measures of vigilance in this region." Corfu Channel Case, [19491 I.C.J. 4, 29.
If significance is to be attached to the state of Greco-Albanian relationships at the time, the
actual holding of the case that a right of free passage existed for the warships of third states during
a period of hostilities would apply a fortiori in time of peace. But it cannot be too strongly
emphasized that the Court professed to be dealing with the peacetime situation. R. BAXTER, supra
note 35, at 164.
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Greece; Albania needed to protect herself against intrusions into a polit-
ically unstable sector of her state territory;" East-West relations in the
immediate post-war era were tense at best. Five months earlier, Al-
banian shore batteries had fired on British cruisers.47 There were no
diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Albania." In this
politically charged atmosphere, the British Royal Navy Task Group
consisting of two cruisers and two destroyers undertook to transit the
strait. The United Kingdom admitted that its motive for passage was
to test the Albanian attitude, and to affirm by a show of force a right
which had been denied by force. 9
The Court still found no violation of Albania's sovereignty and up-
held the innocent character of the passage. If the Court's decision turns
on "motive," or a subjective test,50 the coastal state has the burden of
second-guessing the intention of the transiting warships and for practi-
cal purposes, is placed in the position of being unable to exclude vessels
until it actually suffers some measure of harm.5 1 If, on the other hand,
the "manner of passage," or an objective test, is the controlling factor
in assessing the reasonableness of the coastal claim that passage is non-
innocent,5 2 then a liberal conception of innocent passage has been
adopted by the Court.
It must be emphasized that the Court did not apply the technical
concept of "innocent passage" as later defined in the 1958 Territorial
Sea Convention. Rather, it applied customary international law which
has always required that passage be "innocent," whether in the exercise
of a right of passage in the territorial sea or on the high seas, as there
is no right of prejudicial passage anywhere in time of peace.
" The Court acknowledged that Albania, in view of the circumstances, would have been justified
in issuing regulations in respect of the passage of warships through the strait, but not in prohibiting




* It is believed that unless this emphasis on lawful purpose is attributed to the Court
its decision would make nonsense of all previous and subsequent formulations of inno-
cent passage. . . .It may be emphasized . . . that the purpose of passage . . . was a
very specific one, connected with the issue of the right of innocent passage.
M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 246 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE].
" McDougal and Burke read the case as merely affirming the proposition that the concept of
innocent passage is sufficiently broad to sanction acts, otherwise prejudicial to coastal state secu-
rity, when the purpose of such acts is to affirm a right intimately connected with the territorial
sea in the first instance. They place emphasis on the motive, rather than the manner, of passage.
Id. at 244, 246.
12 Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court ofJustice: General Principles
and Substantive Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 28 (1950).
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With this background, the language in the decision as to the scope of
the transit right upheld is considerably more meaningful:
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accord-
ance with international custom that States in time of peace have a right
to send their warships through straits used for international navigation
between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization
of the coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless
otherwise prescribed in an international convention, there is no right
for a coastal State to prohibit such passage . . . in time of peace. 3
If the foregoing language is interpreted in light of contemporary un-
derstanding of what constitutes "innocent passage" as it applies in the
territorial sea regime generally, the decision makes little sense. The
previous firing on British vessels by Albania, the de facto state of hostili-
ties between Greece and Albania, the motive of the British in transiting
the strait-all strain an interpretation of innocent passage under the
1958 definition. If, however, the case is understood as applying only to
international straits, albeit lying within territorial waters, it reflects a
rational sustaining of the policy to uphold their special legal status in
favor of a right of access for international navigation. In this context,
the right of access upheld is something more than innocent passage as
now defined in the 1958 Convention and more akin to a recognition of
a high seas navigation right. If a satisfactory explanation is to be found,
it lies in the Court's application of the special rules applying to interna-
tional straits, as opposed to those governing the territorial sea generally.
Since Albania presented a strong case for excluding British warships
(as opposed to failure to warn them of the mines), and since the Court
considered all the factors presented in her behalf and still rejected her
position, it is clear that, in the Court's view, vessels of war, like mer-
chant ships, are entitled to a right of access through an international
strait in time of peace.
VI. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND TREATIES
For over a century, international conferences and treaties governing
straits have demonstrated a clearly discernible trend toward greater and
greater freedom of access. These incidents are important because they
represent successful international efforts to free navigation from the
control of coastal states. Moreover, they demonstrate that straits have
in fact been treated differently from territorial waters generally. Confer-
ences on the law of the sea, however, have never dealt with the issue of
- [19491 I.C.J. 4, 28.
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international straits in the context of extensive territorial sea claims.
Straits themselves were never a significant issue because attention was
focused on problems arising from only a very narrow territorial sea.
The 1930 Hague Codification Conference was the first major interna-
tional conference on the law of the sea. Although it did not produce a
treaty, it does provide insights into basic concepts which affect both
straits and navigation in general. The Second Committee, which dealt
with the territorial sea, addressed "the application to narrow straits of
the rules of law concerning territorial waters," as wider straits were not
affected." The only breadths of territorial seas which were seriously
considered were those of three, four and six miles.55 This is consistent
with the committee's observation that "we are only called upon to con-
sider straits the entrance to which is not more than 12 marine miles in
width."15
As the Committee did not consider a wider territorial sea to be viable,
its discussion on straits centered on the relatively obscure question of
whether small enclaves lying within straits, the entrances to which were
overlapped by the territorial sea, should be assimilated to the territorial
sea.57 The Committee did affirm that in those waters of straits which
constitute territorial sea, "it is essential to ensure in time of peace in
all circumstances, the passage of merchant vessels and warships through
straits between two parts of the high sea forming ordinary routes of
international navigation." 8 A liberal policy toward passage through the
teritorial sea in general was manifested and few significant problems in
international cooperation resumed. At the Second Law of the Sea Con-
ference, more attention was given to straits than in 1930 because of the
decision of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case and the dispute over
transit of the Gulf of Aqaba. However, straits were an issue only in
those narrow fact contexts as efforts concentrated on agreement on a
narrow territorial sea breadth, not significantly affecting straits.59
Documents from the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codifica-
tion of International Law, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 88 (Special Supp. 1926). Indicative of this focus
on a narrow territorial sea is the comment by Mr. Miller, the U.S. representative, that:
The value of that right [innocent passage] has been considerably exaggerated in the
books. There are very large parts of the coast throughout the world where the right of
innocent passage is never employed .... While I do not wish to bring up the question
of the limit of the territorial sea, I would point out that, in most cases, the deviation in
the course of a ship is very slight if it is required to go outside that limit; or, let me say,
outside the limit of the territorial waters of the United States, which is three miles.
53 1930 AcTs, supra note 11, at 148.
Id. at 58.
'7 See discussion of the enclave problem in id. at 208.
8 Id.
11 The Soviet proposal that each state would determine the breadth of its territorial waters within
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Only Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone purports to deal directly with straits. The remaining
articles in the same section govern the right of innocent passage and
rules applicable to all ships in the territorial sea. The failure of the
Conference to provide for separate rules in dealing with straits in a
broader context was calculated to result in "some distortion of the
law." 0 This proved to be a gross understatement when efforts to resolve
the permissible width of the territorial sea proved unsuccessful. It is
hardly surprising that, by making the solution to straits a derivative of
a solution to the territorial sea problem., little stability has been
achieved.
As in 1930, increasing dissatisfaction with a three mile territorial sea
was apparent. Agreement on a greater width was not obtained."' If
failure to resolve the territorial sea breadth was the primary shortcom-
ing of the 1958 Conference, the failure to address adequately the straits
problem most assuredly ranked a close second. Furthermore, rules for-
mulated as a result of consideration of straits problems in the context
of a narrow territorial sea should not be expected to reflect the realities
of a legal regime which prevails in a substantially different fact context.
In March 1960 the Second United Nations Law of the Sea Confer-
ence met to resolve the two major issues which had frustrated its efforts
in 1958-the breadth of the territorial sea and coastal state fishing
rights. It failed to reach satisfactory results on either issue.
The Conference did consider a variety of proposals which essentially
provided a choice between a six-mile and a territorial sea. None of the
proposals however, mentioned rights of passage through newly enclosed
limits of three to twelve miles was rejected (3 U.N. Conf. 233, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/C.1/L.80
(1958)), as was a joint proposal by India and Mexico which would have entitled a state to a
territorial sea up to a limit of twelve nautical miles (id. U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/C.l/L.79 (1958)).
A vote on a Canadian proposal for a territorial sea up to a limit of six nautical miles also resulted
in defeat (id. at 232, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/C.I/L.77/REv. 3 (1958)), along with a U.S. proposal
which combines a six mile territorial sea with a twelve mile fisheries zone (id. at 253, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/C.I/L.159/Rev. 2 (1958)). Actual vote on a wider territorial sea rejected breadths
of up to six and twelve miles, respectively. The Soviet proposal was defeated 29-44-9; the India
and Mexico proposal, 35-35-12; the Canadian proposal, 11-48-23; the United States proposal, 36-
38-9.
, See the views of the State of Israel as expressed in Israeli Comments, supra note 28 at 998.
El Article 24 of the Territorial Sea Convention sets forth criteria on the Continguous Zone. This
is sometimes erroneously cited as authority for a 12-mile territorial sea. The proceedings and
history of the Conference are clear that it does not authorize a universal 12-mile territorial sea.
At most, it permits accommodation of those few states which historically have claimed more than
3 miles, but not more than 12 miles. It would, of course, accommodate any new claims up to 12
miles which were legitimate on an independent basis, but does not, of itself, authorize new claims.
62 3 U.N. CONF. 104, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/39 (1958).
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territorial waters, whether in international straits or otherwise. Limited
attention was given to this subject in the debates.
A willingness of some of the major powers in 1958 and 1960 to
support the six-mile proposals, in particular, may suggest that such a
limit would, without special provision for straits, be compatible with
their vital interests. It must be remembered, however, that the focus in
1958, and particularly in 1960, was on reaching agreement on a terri-
torial sea breadth, not on navigation through straits. Then too, propos-
als by the major powers were not unqualified. The British, for example,
would permit each state to claim up to six miles of territorial sea.
However, "rights of passage for aircraft and vessels outside a three-mile
limit were to remain free and unrestricted as before, and were not to be
subject to the control or jurisdiction of the coastal State. '6 2
Thus, not only would the United Kingdom have preserved existing
navigation rights in international straits, but it would have preserved all
navigation rights within areas affected by the extended territorial sea.
Most significantly, the practice of major maritime states since 1960
remains unchanged and continues to indicate that they do not intend to
relinquish rights which they presently enjoy. Finally, a six mile terri-
torial sea is no longer the popularly proposed width. The present twelve
mile proposal patently affects practically all major international straits,
thereby escalating the potential conflict for all nations engaged in mari-
time transit.
VII. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The movement over the past few centuries in favor of greater freedom
of passage is well-illustrated by various bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments giving effect to that objective. The foremost example of freeing
an international strait formerly under total coastal state domination is
the Turkish Straits, which control access to the Black Sea. s3 Since the
capture of Constantinople in 1453, Turkey has held a position at the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles somewhat similar to that of Denmark
in the Western Baltic." Turkey was forced by Russia through the Treaty
" Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, supra note 4.
64 So long as the shores of the Black Sea were exclusively possessed by Turkey, that sea might
with propriety be considered a mare clausum; and there seems no reason to question the right of
the Ottoman Porte to exclude other nations from navigating the passage which connects it with
the Mediterranean, both shores of this passage being at the same time portions of the Turkish
territory; but since the territorial acquisitions made by Russia, and the commercial establishments
formed by her on the shores of the Euxine, both that empire and the other maritime powers have
become entitled to participate in the commerce of the Black Sea, and consequently to the free
navigation of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. H. WHEATON, supra note 10, at 292.
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of Kuchuk-Kainardji (1774) and later through several treaties with
Great Britain, to open the straits first for merchant ships and later for
a limited number of warships.65
The Turkish Straits are presently governed by the Montreux Conven-
tion of July 20, 1936." Article I provides for "freedom of transit and
navigation in the Straits" and that the exercise of that freedom shall
henceforth be regulated by the provisions of the Convention. 7 The Con-
vention emphasizes that special rights were granted to the coastal state
not in its own interest alone but also in that of the international com-
munity. It qualifies the powers conferred upon the coastal state border-
ing an international strait, while at the same time proclaiming the prin-
ciple of freedom of navigation as a principle of international law inde-
pendent of the will of the parties."'
Approaches to the Baltic Sea are controlled by the Danish Straits,
which connect it with the North Sea and completely lie within the
territorial sea of Denmark and Sweden. Like the Turkish Straits, the
Sound and the two Belts which comprise the straits had been under
coastal state control sanctioned by a succession of treaties and arrange-
ments with other powers." Until the 17th century, Denmark collected
tolls on ships using the straits. States asserted progressively more stri-
dent protests against these tolls and demanded abolition of the "Sound-
dues," referring to their "right of using the ocean as the highway of
commerce." They further pointed out that according to the Law of
Nations, "the navigation of the two seas connected by this strait is free
to all nations; and therefore the navigation of the channel by which they
are connected ought to be free."70
These demands culminated in an 1857 agreement which permanently
abolished the tolls and permitted passage of warships, subject to special
arrangements which were within the prerogative of Denmark to regu-
late. The agreement represented a purely negative abolition of a power
exercised by the coastal state against the interests of the international
community. Although the term "free" initially referred to "toll free"
0 For a historical discussion of the Straits, see R. BAXTER, supra note 35, at 165.
" Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, supra note 4.
67 The Montreux Convention, contains elaborate conditions for transit. It does not use the term
"innocent passage." Complete freedom of transit and navigation in favor of merchant ships is
stipulated. Warships are subject to restrictions, particularly regarding notice, tonnage, belligerent
status, etc. Passage of submarines is forbidden, except that the Black Sea powers are given limited
rights to bring their submarines in or send them out to the Mediterranean, subject to previous
notification to the Turkish government.
' See 2 E. BRUEL, supra note 30, at 425.
" See H. WHEATON, supra note 10, at 295.
I' 1 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 660 (1906).
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in the Danish Straits, it has also come to mean "freedom of navigation."
The Danish delegate at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference noted this
practice in advocating freedom of passage through straits:
Part of the Danish coast bordered an international strait joining two
parts of the high seas, and for more than one hundred years his country
had maintained freedom of navigation through that strait in the inter-
ests of international trade. Such an obligation as that which his coun-
try had assumed should be counterbalanced by corresponding rights in
other parts of the world, and Denmark accordingly expected that there
would be free passage for its ships through straits in the territorial seas
of other states."
Consistent with the trend to liberate certain international straits his-
torically under coastal state domination by virtue of the fact that they
were totally enclosed by narrow territorial seas, some nations also made
provisions against coastal state claims which might extend to straits not
yet considered to be under the control of littoral states. A number of
international agreements ensued which recognized the freedom of pas-
sage through straits whose width far exceeded the sum of the belts of
territorial sea running through them. Best known among this category
of straits is Gibralter. Unlike the Danish or Turkish Straits, the Straits
of Gibralter, since the days of Roman dominion, have not been subject
to exclusive coastal state control and have long been viewed as open to
all nations. In the 19th century Wheaton wrote that:
If the straits of Gibralter, for example, were bounded on both sides by
the possessions of the same nation, and if they were sufficiently narrow
to be commanded by cannon-shot from both shores, this passage
would not be the less freely open to all nations; since the navigation,
both of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, is free to all."
The challenge was not, then, to free the Straits of Gibralter, but to
prevent encroachments. In response to this challenge several decades
later Great Britain and France entered into the Declaration of 1904.
Article VII of that Declaration provides that "In order to secure the free
passage of the Straits of Gibralter, the two Governments agree not to
permit the erection of any fortification or strategic works on that por-
tion of the coast. . . ."" This was designed to guarantee that nations
11 2 U.N. CONF. 65, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/38 (1958).
n H. WHEATON, supra note 10, at 292.
n Declaration between Great Britain and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, together with
the Secret Articles, signed at London, April 8, 1904, art. VII, 101 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATES
PAPERS 1053 (1912). Also, see Declaration between France and Spain concerning the adherence




might continue their usage,74 even where the channel used for navigation
might require shipping to pass through the territorial waters of the
coastal state.
Another instance of this process of securing an extensive international
waterway to free use by all nations was the guarantee in the retrocession
to Japan of the Strait of Formosa that as a "great sea highway of the
nations," it would remain open to use by all and remain beyond the
exclusive control or appropriation of that country.75
In the latter part of the 19th century, the concept of free access made
progress in the Western Hemisphere. Following the independence of the
Spanish colonies, the control of the Straits of Magellan became an issue
between Chile and Argentina. Maritime nations accustomed to using
the straits protested against any attempt to place them under coastal
state control. Widespread concern induced Chile and Argentina to con-
clude a treaty in 1881 which provided for free navigation by all nations.7
This principle has been observed since and has been interpreted to per-
mit the passage of warships not only in time of peace, but also in time
of war.77
A parallel development to greater freedom in straits was the opening
of three major interoceanic canals (Kiel, Suez and Panama) by agree-
ments which are virtually identical in their terms. To some observers
this characterizes the emergence of a "common law of international
canals," ' although such law is based more on historical coincidence
than on any theoretical consideration like freedom of the seas as applied
to straits. Nevertheless there is considerable similarity between straits
and canals.
As the law stands today, canals and straits bear a close affinity as
regards freedom of transit in time of peace. A series of grants in the
one case and freedom of the seas in the other have-worked to bring
about the same result. The establishment of a right of free passage
common to both categories of waterways has been aided by the func-
tional analogy resulting from the fact that both offer access from one
stretch of the high seas to another. The characterization of a canal as
" 2 E. BRUEL, supra note 30, at 152.
n R. BAXTER, supra note 35, at 8.
74 Treaty between the Argentine Republic and Chile, defining the boundaries between the two
countries, Buenos Aires, July 23, 188 1, reproduced from 71 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS
1103.
" The provision has also been interpreted in this way in practice, warships of belligerent powers
have always passed through the Strait, as e.g., during the Spanish-American War 1898. For further
discussion see 2 E. BRUEL, supra note 30, at 200-51.
18 See R. BAXTER, supra note 35, at 185.
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an 'artificial strait' is a highly accurate one, provided it is understood
that a canal may achieve that status but it is not necessarily born to
it. It is a consequence of this similarity of function that in time of peace
the right of transit through both types of waterway remains untram-
meled."9
Although artifical canals do not inherently enjoy the same legal status
as natural straits, what is important is the movement to assimilate them
to the same free passage legal regime governing natural straits.8 0
In analyzing these treaties, several conclusions are inescapable:
(1) To the extent that treaties recognized coastal state powers over
navigation, they were only recognized where they had been historically
exercised. There has been no general recognition of a right of a state to
extend its territorial sea and thereby control transit in a newly enclosed
strait.
(2) No exclusive claim to deny all access to any international strait
has been successful. Even states disposed to use force to back up their
exclusive claims have eventually had to yield to wider community inter-
ests. Although the international community has acquiesced in certain
coastal state practices that vary somewhat procedurally in each treaty-
governed regime, in all straits where the international community has
had an interest and a need for passage, whether by merchant or war
vessels, accommodation has been reached.
(3) In those straits lying within the territorial sea of one or more
states, each agreement, or renegotiation of a previous agreement, re-
sulted in greater freedom of access.
(4) These agreements signify an objective body of conventions which
states may no longer be free to repudiate because, in the broadest sense,
they reflect an international norm of conduct favoring free access or free
passage.8' For a principle such as free access to constitute an effective
basis of international law, it must stand above the revocable consent of
individual states. The temptation regarding treaties which have been
formulated to promote free navigation in international straits is to con-
strue them as binding only the parties. It cannot be ignored, however,
that in each case a treaty resulted because of demands on the part of
11 Id. at 185-86.
s0 "[Wlhen an artificial waterway connecting two open seas has been permanently dedicated to
the use of the whole world, such waterway is assimilated to natural straits in the sense that even
the passage of a belligerent man-of-war does not compromise the neutrality of the sovereign State
under whose jurisdiction the waters in question lie." Case of the S.S. "Wimbledon", [19231
P.C.1.J., ser. A. No. I, at 28.
" See R. BAXTER, supra note 35, at 177.
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states which did not control both shores of the strait and of demands
that community expectations upholding free access be observed.
VIII. POLICY AGAINST ENCROACHMENTS ON ACCESS
A contemporary example which gives considerable insight into the
policy against encroachments on access is the policy which governs
rights in the territorial sea which is affected by straight baselines. In
delimiting the territorial sea, the question is whether in waters which
become internal when the straight baseline system is applied the right
of passage should be retained in the same way as in the territorial sea.
Traditionally, baselines involved closing off minor indentations of the
coastline, then delimiting the width of the territorial sea. Such indenta-
tions were significant only in that they affected the outer limit of the
territorial sea, as the line across the indentation was not conceived as
separating an area of internal waters on the landward side from an
expanse of territorial sea measured seaward of the line. Rather, all
waters on both sides of the line were regarded as part of the regime of
the territorial sea, the inward boundary line normally being the low
watermark. Later, however, states generally came to claim that as the
closing line marks the baseline from which the territorial sea is mea-
sured, it therefore begins at such baseline. Waters on the landward side,
therefore, became regarded as internal waters.
A juridical endorsement of the latter view resulted from the judgment
of the ICJ rendered on December 10, 1951, in the Fisheries Case be-
tween the United Kingdom and Norway. Norway was permitted to use
straight baselines along parts of its coast which was deeply indented to
measure the breadth of its territorial sea. Until that judgment, internal
waters extended only to rivers, lakes, estuaries and certain deep
bays-waters almost exclusively behind the coastline. The effect of that
judgment (which was primarily concerned with the outer boundary of
the territorial sea) was that waters behind the straight baselines and the
coast acquired a new legal status: instead of remaining part of the
territorial sea, they became new internal waters.
The proliferation of claims following the Fisheries Case called for a
reexamination of the consequences of straight baselines and their im-
pact on international rights previously enjoyed. In 1958, the problem
was addressed. Attention focused, however, on preserving existing navi-
gation rights in territorial seas which would become internal waters but
were still, geographically, part of the sea and necessary to navigation.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom emphasized that the use
of baselines would have to be reconciled with "existing rights of pas-
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sage," and that "in case of a conflict, the right of passage, as a prior
right and the right of the international community, must prevail over
any alleged claim of individual coastal States to extend the areas subject
to their exclusive jurisdiction.""2
The original International Law Commission's draft Article 5 of the
Territorial Sea Convention addressed the baseline problem, but made
no provision for the preservation of existing international rights which
would otherwise be extinguished by rigidly applying an internal waters
regime to newly enclosed portions of the territorial sea. The United
Kingdom noted this omission and urged that the Commission propose
"a general principle that where territorial waters were thus abruptly
transformed into internal waters, following the drawing of straight base-
lines, the right of innocent passage in such waters should persist, to
allow international shipping to continue to use them without let or
hindrance." 3
Defenders of the draft Article 5 argued that "The Commission could
not, after giving the coastal State the right to draw straight base lines,
take away the main corollary of that right by making provisions for the
right of passage." 4
The United Kingdom, however, pointed out that since waters which
were seaward o the coastline might juridically become internal waters,
while remaining more akin to territorial waters, "it was therefore just
as rational and necessary to have recognized access to them as pre-
viously."8 5 The British position prevailed and was adopted by the Con-
vention as Article 5. Significantly, the Convention's approach was func-
tional and did not attempt to distinguish differing navigation rights
which would otherwise have resulted from an artificial interior waters-
territorial sea median line.
Arguments are presently being advanced that nations should apply
the Article 5 rationale to high seas which would become territorial seas
under newly recognized claims. The Commission to study the Organiza-
tion of Peace, under the chairmanship of Louis B. Sohn, undertook a
study of the issues to be considered by the Law of the Sea Conference.
The Commission published a report in 1973 and stressed that as a
matter of community interest, long established freedoms of navigating
" Franqois, Regime of the High Seas and Regime of the Territorial Sea, I19561 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/97 (1956).
Id. at 9.
id.
Franqois, Regime of the High Seas; Regime of the Territorial Sea, [1956] I Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/97 (1956).
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in the high seas should apply as much as possible in extended territorial
seas:
To compensate the international community for the horizontal exten-
sion of national jurisdiction, coastal States should agree to define
innocent passage through the territorial sea in such a way correspond-
ing closely to the existing freedom of navigation. The relevant provi-
sion might be analagous to Article 5 of the Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea which retained the right of innocent passage in areas which
became internal waters of a State as a result of drawing straight base-
lines along a coast."6
Applying the Article 5 philosophy to the territorial sea, the Commis-
sion recommends: "Similarly, freedom of navigation might continue to
apply in those areas which would become a part of the territorial sea as
a result of extending that sea to twelve miles from the coast, but which
have long served as normal traffic lanes for international shipping.""
Finally, as regards international straits, the Commission concluded
that
In particular, this principle should apply where international traffic
has customarily used shipping lanes passing through an international
strait connecting two areas of the high seas or leading to the territorial
sea of a third State or to a port open to international navigation. In
such cases, the State or States bordering on the strait should not have
the right to curtail the existing freedom of navigation or overflight.8
IX. CONCLUSION
The rights of access to the sea and to sea ports, passage from one high
seas to another and from high seas to territorial seas, and freedom on
navigation of the high seas have not been easily or injudiciously con-
ferred upon the community of nations. They are the result of centuries
of conflicting claims, of delicate balancing of sovereign against sover-
eign, of individual nation against community interest. They are the
result, not of a theoretical pretext, but of a pattern of practice solidified
by the practicalities of necessity and accommodation. They reflect a
community interest adaptable to change, and demonstrate that such
interest with regard to international straits remains "far more vital than
simply the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea."8"
u L. B. Sohn, The United Nations and the Oceans, Twenty-Third Report, Commission to Study
the Organization of Peace at 18 (1973).
v Id.
U Id.
9 See comments by J.N. Moore, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.58, at II.
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These rights have suffered temporary setbacks, excesses, abuses, but
the trend toward greater freedom of access is undeniable. For straits in
particular, it is evident that there has been a consistently strong tend-
ency over the past century to restrict the competence of coastal states
over straits.9 0 In his study of international straits, Eric Bruel expressed
the opinion that "the fact that a legal status sui juri has been created
for international straits in general and that regimes more or less logical
have been established for particularly important straits has shown that
strong normative forces are at work in this sphere."'"
Some states have recently challenged those traditional forces. Basing
their claims on a broad territorial sea concept only, a few states have
advocated the establishment of new, unprecedented controls over move-
ment of vessels and aircraft through some of the most important mari-
time arteries of international communication. Much attention has fo-
cused on the claims of individual states with little recognition of com-
munity interests already vested and new claims which must find accom-
modation.
Debates in the United States Seabeds Committee have sharpened
thinking on this problem. Clearly, those states which condition recogni-
tion of extended territorial sea claims on preservation of free navigation
are seeking not the creation of any new rights or privileges but simply
the maintenance of the existing freedoms of navigation and of over-
flight.92
The former Legal Advisor, Department of State, and now Head of
the United States Delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference, Ambas-
sador John Stevenson, succinctly noted:
Neither history nor logic compels any state to concede that an exten-
sion of territorial seas has the same effects upon the rights of the
international community in straits as it has in other coastal areas. The
balance of international and coastal interests is quite different in these
two situations. . . [T]he right to transit straits should be regarded in
law for what it is in fact: an inherent and inseparable adjunct of the
freedoms of navigation and overflight on the high seas themselves. 3
The existence of the navigation rights presently enjoyed by the inter-
national community has also been recognized by some countries claim-
ing a twelve-mile territorial sea, including France and the Soviet Union.
M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 50, at 211.
, 2 E. BRUEL, supra note 30, at 424.
2 Baxter, Statement on the Law of the Sea, delivered at the Lagos Session of the Asian-African
Legal Consultative Committee, Jan. 20, 1972.
11 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 261, 263 (1971).
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The Soviet Union pointed out that "the international regime should
preserve the generally recognized freedom of navigation and overflight
in straits which linked areas of the high seas and which had traditionally
been used for that purpose on the same basis as the high seas them-
selves."'" Furthermore, the Russians felt that proposals which sought to
extend to straits used for international navigation the principle of inno-
cent passage which applied in the territorial sea were unacceptable,
because they "disregarded the special position of straits which linked
two areas of the high seas and were widely used for international naviga-
tion."95 Norway, Australia, Poland, Italy and other states have also
stressed that straits require special treatment and that the rules should
not be the same as those for passage through the territorial sea.9"
Among the most articulate expressions of the distinct legal regime to
which straits navigation rights appertain is that of Professor Richard
Baxter:
It may at this point be objected that if a strait consists entirely of belts
of territorial sea or of territorial waters separated by a strip of high
seas, the law applicable to such waterways should be the usual law
applying to the jurisdiction of states on the high seas or in the terri-
torial sea, as the case may be. This conclusion would suggest that there
is no reason for the establishment of any special body of law applicable
to straits alone. The existence, however, of a variety of conventional
arrangements having application to individual waterways and of a
body of customary law dedicated to this particular type of waterway
makes it impossible to start from this easy assumption. 7
Professor Baxter warns that
the logical consequence of the assimilation of the waters of straits and
of the territorial sea would be the elimination of any separate body of
doctrine relating to straits, for the law respecting passage through
territorial waters within a strait would differ in no respect from the
principles having application to passage through the territorial sea of
a state which does not form part of a strait."8
' U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.58, at 7.
' Sohn recommends that enlarging the width of the territorial sea to twelve miles would not
affect the special status of international shipping lanes passing through international straits. L.
Sohn, supra note 86, at 38.
" U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.60, at 19 (Poland); U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.15, at
7 (Australia); U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.15 at 9 (Italy); and U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
SC.II/SR.62, at 12 (Norway). Mr. Brazil, of Australia, drew attention to the general principle
of the law of the sea that "where coastal waters that were high seas ceased to have that status,
rights of communication should nevertheless be preserved." U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/ SR.15,
at 7.
,7 R. BAXTER, supra note 35, at 10.
11 Id. at 166.
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Moreover, to recognize the powers in the riparian state which would
necessarily flow from the abolishment of that distinction "would impose
needless and undesirable limitations on any 'right' of free passage.",
The conclusion is most compelling that through the practice of states
international straits have acquired a suijuris legal character which is
equal to and independent from, the legal regime of the territorial sea.
Recognition of the sui juris legal character of international straits
does not, in itself, resolve those problems which marine traffic poses. It
does, however, offer a legal framework within which an acceptable
solution can be devised. Certain coastal state powers, such as the right
to control passage, are inconsistent with that status and have not, in
practice, provided viable solutions. States can realistically be expected
to resist all manifestations of coastal state control since navigation and
overflight affect their fundamental security interests. The lessons of
Gibralter, Magellan, the Bosporus and Dardanelles, and others point
out that if coastal states claim the right to control passage, they will
inevitably be exposed to varied pressures, to grant or to deny passage
to foreign vessels. If states were to select those nations whose vessels
might freely navigate straits within their territorial seas, they risk need-
less controversy, consequently placing themselves in a far more perilous
position than if they permitted free use of the straits by all states. The
most advantageous position for such states is that of guardian of the
interests of the international community. In this capacity they can ulti-
mately expect greater security to result as they appropriately execute
their communal functions. Rather than seeking security by methods in
disregard of the legal status of international straits, their security is
enhanced by their awareness of that legal status.
Coastal state powers other than arbitrary competence to suspend or
deny passage are available to deal with new risks and hazards in a
manner completely consistent with the legal status of straits. For exam-
ple, if passage of a particular vessel poses a grave and imminent threat
to important coastal interests, the coastal state is universally regarded
as having competence to take protective action, to include temporarily
suspending passage for cause, or even intervening on the high seas to
abate a particular threat. 00 Thus, in catastrophic situations it need not
assert itself without remedy, and a broader authority such as that to
deny or suspend all passage is unnecessary.' 0' In each situation, it is the
"9 Id.
'** Cundick, High Seas Intervention: Parameters of Unilateral Action, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
514, 526, 531 (1973).
10I Littoral states may act in certain ways for the preservation of their safety and the
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particular threat which gives rise to the competence to abate it.
As to persistent problems which are less grave in isolated instances,
but pose a cumulative, harmful effect, states advocating the continued
exercise of free passage have a responsibility to develop a viable solution
with coastal states. This is particularly true in areas such as marine
pollution and traffic control. Freedom has never meant freedom from
responsibility, or ultimately, control. Freedom consistently abused de-
mands controls to limit the action of the abuser. In international law
the meld of controls must be carefully apportioned so as to permit
coastal state protection of vital interest, while maintaining international
constraint upon coastal state powers which would exceed necessary lim-
its. Although in an expanded territorial sea context, reasonable pollu-
tion and traffic control measures consistent with freedom of passage are
within the purview of coastal state powers, international rules must be
established to prevent detrimental conduct, with appropriate remedies
for damages.
The many problems arising from ocean use and the continual clash
among nations on grounds of sovereignty could result in mutual rejec-
tion of the international law of the sea, leading to chaos and a resort to
armed conflict. As to navigational interests, a more rational approach
would allow states representing opposing interests to acknowledge that
the underlying principles upon which high seas access is founded remain
valid, but must be malleable in their application to modern problems.
Any equitable legal order for the oceans must be acceptable to most,
if not all, states. A solution which a majority attempts to impose, and
which does not take into account existing realitites and the differing
interests of states, will be unsatisfactory. Established rights of states
under existing law must not be arbitrarily derided or altered without
consent of the states concerned. Where legitimate conflicts exist, the
solution must be sufficient to guarantee continued access for all. If, for
example, the majority attempts to force certain states to relinquish their
existing right to access, by concluding a treaty to which such states are
not parties, the dangers are significant. First, the actual burden of en-
forcing such an unlawful denial of the use of a particular strait to such
vessels would lie with the state bordering the strait. If the transiting
vessel chose to exercise its right of access and the coastal state forced a
protection of their laws over an undefined and indefinite stretch of coastal water ....
[T]he whole idea of a peculiar and definite marginal sea tends to be discredited. Real
danger to the littoral state or its laws, and actual infractions of these laws, are the tests
of the right of the state to act, rather than the scene of that action.
POTTER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 103, 104 (1924).
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confrontation, it could rapidly become embroiled in a major dispute.
Second, the legality of coastal state action, except in specific cases
where actual harm of considerable magnitude is threatened, is not well-
founded as states presently have vested international customary law
rights to use international straits. Third, even if the nations of the world
concluded a treaty in the United Nations permitting states controlling
straits to deny such passage, it would not bind non-signatories, nor
could it eventually become customary international law as against states
which continued to use such straits and did not acquiesce to coastal state
control. A final alternative is armed force, which offers little that is
constructive to stability or final settlement of the problem.
By far the most advantageous solution is a functional approach which
is not at the expense of any nation. If the notion of the territorial sea
must persist, functional recognition of community interests such as nav-
igation must result. The minimal requirements of a durable solution
would include recognition (1) that the right of access to international
straits is an established community right; (2) that the right of access
exists independent of the breadth of the territorial sea; hence, a state
which validly extends its territorial sea does so subject to the navigation
rights already vested in the communtiy of nations; (3) that respecting
navigation, sovereign states, as equals, have a mutual right to pursue
their sovereign activities in ocean space; (4) that, whether by interna-
tional means or objective coastal state means, regulatory authority,
short of prohibiting transit, or subjecting it to unreasonable constraints,
must be permitted the coastal state for purposes of pollution and traffic
control; and (5) that the benefit to the world community in a continued
right of access requires a higher standard of care and willingness to
compensate coastal states in the event of actual injury resulting from
the use of straits to the latter's detriment.
These elements, properly formulated in a Law of the Sea treaty, can
go a long way toward providing the framework for resolving the present
and future problems respecting navigation.
The principle of freedom of access still forms the basis of the present
law of the sea and should not be indiscriminately blended with fisheries,
seabed, resource, or other issues. In the long-term perspective, the exist-
ing, historically recognized rights of free passage must not be made
subject to the good will, the international political conditions, and the
vicissitudes of the foreign policy and relations of coastal states. Armed
confrontation must be avoided if at all possible. The wide array of
peaceful methods of resolving substantive issues must certainly con-
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demn such action. The means of solving the navigation problem func-
tionally within the framework of an acceptable international treaty
exist. The time to reach accomodation peacefully is opportune. An
increasingly interdependent world cannot settle for less.
EPILOGUE
The necessary elements for a successful LOS treaty have not as yet
solidified. Although last summer marked the formal beginning of a
conference which many nations hope will eventually result in such a
treaty, little real progress was made in the opening session in Caracas,
Venezuela, which conluded with more than 1,500 delegates from 148
nations deadlocked on many key issues, including straits.
The outlook for the spring session in Geneva, Switzerland, moreover,
remains, at best, cautiously optimistic. Although some states appear to
have based their positions on their fundamental LOS interests, others
appear to have aligned themselves on issues for political reasons having
little nexus to LOS. This relatively strict political rigidity leaves little
opportunity to address issues on their merits and may not only prevent
individual states from adopting positions wholly in their best interests,
but also result in formulation of a collective position which, if adopted,
will fall short of a viable solution. Because of this, there is considerable
danger that the Conference may fail to achieve any long-range settle-
ment of LOS issues, the nonresolution of which will assuredly have far-
reaching economic and political consequences.
The lack of significant progress on the straits issue has been discour-
aging to many observers. This is not surprising, however, because straits
are but one of many important LOS problems before the Conference,
many of which will impact reciprocally on each other. Whereas this
interdependence has been a justification for a comprehensive treaty,
perhaps the greatest shortcoming revealed by the Conference is that it
is overambitious in attempting to deal so comprehensively with the
problems affecting the allocation and use of ocean space and resources.
Resolution is sought of such complex issues as breadth of the territorial
sea, coastal state economic jurisidction over fisheries and resources of
the continental shelf and seabed, marine pollution, scientific research
and international machinery for dealing with seabed areas beyond the
limits of coastal state economic jurisdiction. Each could be the subject
of a separate treaty. It is not surprising, then, that agreement on straits
has been particularly difficult to obtain. Substance aside, because of the
high priority placed by the major maritime powers on access to straits,
states appear to be holding that issue as a bargaining chip to obtain
19751
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other important concessions, particularly resource concessions. Con-
sequently, it is difficult to ascertain how realistically the straits problem
will ultimately be resolved once resource and other key issues unrelated
to straits have been accommodated.
Despite the vast number of issues, their complexity, and the little
substantive progress in negotiations to date, some trends have emerged.
There is broad support for at least a 12 mile territorial sea and a broad
coastal state economic zone up to 200 miles. (Maritime states will ac-
cept the foregoing providing access rights through and over straits used
for international navigation are preserved.) There is also wide support
for freedom of navigation on the surface, submerged and in the air
beyond 12 miles.
Most proposals have focused on straits 24 miles or less in width and
have emphasized either the need for all nations to retain their right of
access, or the need for coastal states to permit or deny access as neces-
sary to protect their interests. The latter approach does not differentiate
straits from the territorial sea and would subject them to the territorial
sea regime with a right of nonsuspendible innocent passage.
Typical of this approach are the proposals of various straits states,
principally Spain, Morocco, Philippines, Indonesia, Greece, Cyprus,
Yemen and Malaysia. They advocate broad coastal state competence
to prescribe and enforce regulations governing virtually all facets of
navigation in straits, including designation of sealanes, establishment of
anti-pollution controls, safety requirements and regulations of maritime
transport in general, and the passage of ships with special cargos or
special characteristics. Such competence would include prior authoriza-
tion for passage of certain ships, such as warships, or those carrying oil
or other hazardous substances. Security interests would also be a basis
to deny passage to particular vessels.
The United States and USSR advocate the continued access ap-
proach and have submitted proposals to accommodate straits states.
These proposals would limit coastal state authority in that no state
could prescribe conditions on which other states exercise their transit
rights. Instead, regulatory authority would be placed under the auspices
of an international authority and individual states would be responsible
for ensuring compliance of their flag carriers with the international
standards. Vessels wou!d be required to comply with traffic separation
schemes initiated internationally, as by the International Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (IMCO) and aircraft would be required to com-
ply with regulations of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), with strict liability for damage caused by deviations from inter-
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national regulations and procedures.
The proposals of the straits states and major maritime states submit-
ted in the UN preparatory sessions prior to the Caracas session re-
mained largely unchanged. In that session, however, the United King-
dom submitted its draft articles on the territorial sea and straits. 02 The
portion of its draft dealing with straits used for international navigation
offers what is probably the most realistic proposal yet submitted to the
Conference. It comes closest to imparting to both straits states and
maritime states the essence of what they require (as opposed to
demand). It would preserve a right of access which it terms "transit
passage" for all ships and aircraft which "shall not be impeded." Func-
tionally, it permits navigation through straits connecting high seas or
connecting high seas to a bordering state, yet it does not alter existing
international agreements relating to specific straits. Neither does it at-
tempt to internationalize narrow straits which, although widely used by
international traffic, have been regulated by straits states. It provides
certain provisions as protection to coastal straits states in that specific
duties are imposed upon ships and aircraft exercising the right of transit
passage. These include proceeding through the strait without delay,
engaging in no activities not incident to transit, refraining from any
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of the adjacent straits state, and complying with generally
accepted international regulations governing safety and pollution. It
also permits the straits state, subject to approval of a competent interna-
tional organization, to designate sea-lanes or to prescribe traffic separa-
tion schemes, as well as nondiscriminatory laws implementing interna-
tional regulations governing the discharge of oil and other noxious sub-
stances. The flag state of aircraft and ships entitled to sovereign immun-
ity would be liable for any damage resulting from acts in contravention
of the foregoing. Conversely, if the straits state abuses its authority it
must compensate the owners of the vessel or aircraft for resulting loss
or damage. User states are expected to share with straits states the costs
of necessary navigation and safety aids or other improvements in aid
of international navigation or for the prevention and control of pollution
from ships.
The United Kingdom proposal may not find wide acceptance. On the
other hand, it presents a realistic framework for negotiation. It is the
best compromise to date of the drafts submitted by the straits states and
the United States and Soviet Union. Whether those states are prepared
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to negotiate along those lines, must, of course, be resolved at the Con-
ference itself.
The criteria for a successful treaty may be difficult to articulate, but
that should not be permitted to dissuade negotiators from attempting
to do so. Clearly, successful negotiations must allow for the continued
access to international straits by all states in a framework which permits
the resolution of problems created for adjacent coastal straits states by
the increased use of international air and sea traffic. A lasting settle-
ment cannot exist if individual states have their vital access rights sub-
ject to the arbitrary control of other states. Safe, efficient transit in
congested straits areas is essential. To attain this inevitably will require
that air and sea movement in many straits be subject to much more
detailed control and supervision than was previously needed, or than is
necessary in larger high seas areas. The source of this authority must
be an international body. Coastal states should, however, participate in
the process of prescription and reasonable enforcement of international
standards. Also there should be a reasonable distribution among the
user states of costs resulting from international traffic.
Finally, it is clear from both the preparatory and Caracas Conference
sessions that not only must substantive issues be negotiated, but agree-
ment must be had by those most vitally affected. If, for example, a
treaty acceptable to the majority of states is unacceptable to the numeri-
cally few major maritime states, it will have little vitality. Equally un-
successful would be an agreement failing to accommodate the numeri-
cally few straits states. Hopefully, the Geneva session this spring will
permit states to take greater cognizance of these factors and to enter
into more meaningful, realistic negotiations.
202 United Kingdom: Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea and Straits, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2/L.3 (1974).
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